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Abstract  
An undeniable fact is that, as it happens in every country of the world, the 
United States’ (U.S.) government, mainly through its policies, plays a major 
role in the way the American economy, as a whole, evolves. This study intends 
to shed some light on this effect by assessing whether the status of the 
government (Divided vs Unified) can be considered an additional source of 
Political Risk. The main rationale is that the repartition of executive and 
legislative powers affects the probability of policy change, which will 
ultimately lead to different levels of political risk. Notwithstanding, the 
direction in which this repartition is expected to affect the aforementioned 
relationship is not clear among the existent literature and has never been 
empirically tested. Thus, through an extensive comparison between the U.S. 
government’s status, from 1950 until 2007, and the stock market volatility we 
will determine how this relationship works for the biggest and most relevant 
stock market in the world. We find that having a divided government 
(Congress and President, controlled by different parties) leads to an increase of 
stock market volatility. Thus, for the United States, we can say that we found 
evidence that the gridlock theory does not hold. Furthermore, the conclusions 
are quite robust, remaining congruent after the inclusion of several control 
variables and a demanding set of econometric tests. 
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Resumo  
Os governos têm um inegável impacto na economia e, tal como em qualquer 
país do mundo, através das suas políticas, o Governo dos Estados Unidos da 
América desempenha um papel fulcral na economia americana. Este trabalho, 
ao estudar a influência que o status de governo (Dividido ou Unificado) tem no 
risco político, propõe a clarificação deste efeito. Assim, este estudo alicerça-se 
numa ideia muito simples: a repartição de poderes, legislativo e executivo, 
afeta a probabilidade de ocorrência de uma mudança das políticas seguidas até 
então, o que se poderá traduzir numa alteração do risco político. No entanto, na 
literatura existente, este efeito (aumento vs diminuição do risco) não é claro, 
nem tão pouco, consensual. Além disso, o caso americano, embora seja um dos 
mais importantes países tanto a nível económico como político, nunca foi 
estudado, a nível empírico. Assim, através de uma extensa comparação (desde 
1950 a 2007) entre o status do governo americano (Dividido vs Unificado) e a 
volatilidade do mercado acionista, propusemo-nos a estudar esta relação, para 
o mercado acionista mais relevante do mundo. Os resultados sugerem que uma 
repartição dos poderes, isto é quando Congresso e Presidência são controlados 
por diferentes partidos, resulta num aumento da volatilidade do mercado 
acionista. Podemos, portanto, afirmar que, no que respeita ao caso americano, 
a evidência sugere que a teoria do bloqueio não se verifica. As conclusões são 
robustas e continuam a sê-lo com após exigentes testes econométricos e a 
introdução de várias variáveis de controlo. 
 
Palavras-chave: Estados Unidos da América; Governo Dividido; Risco Político; 
Volatilidade do Mercado Acionista. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As it is widely accepted in the economic literature, governments throughout 
the world play a very important role in the way their domestic economies 
evolve. The U.S. government is obviously no exception. Through conducting 
economic policies, implementing laws and regulations, among other actions, 
they end up shaping the economic environment in which businesses operate 
on. Through these mechanisms we can see that government’s actions will 
ultimately have an impact in terms of the risk the firms face.  
In the field of Finance, since it is in the root of every investment decision, risk 
is a very important subject but also extremely difficult to understand. This is 
one of the reasons why it is very important to understand every single aspect of 
it, and thus, in this dissertation, my focus will be the Political Risk (or Policy 
Risk) i.e. “uncertainty about the impact of an administration’s future policies” 
(Kim et al, 2012, pp. 196). The importance of this topic is undeniable and 
stems primarily from two aspects. First, even though it is consensual that 
governments have, all over the world, an impact in the economy, it is also true 
that there are a lot of specificities that remain to be understood. One is clearly 
the one at hand: Does divided governments affect the probability of economic 
change and consequently the political risk levels in the financial markets? 
Second, and to the best of my knowledge, this dissertation fills a gap in the 
literature since there is no such study for the most important market in the 
world (the U.S.). 
More specifically we will empirically assess whether having a divided 
government (as opposed to a unified government) has a significant impact in 
the Political Risk at which the United States’ firms (and thus, stock market 
investors) are exposed. We will use political and stock market data from 1950 
until 2007, and will take advantage from the fact that return volatility is one of 
the most widely accepted measures of risk. Results strongly indicate that times 
of divided government are associated with higher stock market volatility, 
challenging thus, the gridlock theory, at least for the American case. 
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Regarding this dissertation’s structure, we will start by presenting a review of 
the literature so we can gather a deeper understanding of the origins of this 
discussion. In the third chapter, the data, both political and financial, will be 
presented, as well as the main descriptive stats, the variables and the models 
used. Chapter 4 presents the results of the econometric models, that are further 
discussed in the fifth chapter. Chapter 6 presents a set of robustness tests to 
assess the strength and reliability of the results. Chapter 7 concludes the 
dissertation, summarizing the main insights, discussing some results and 
bringing up some suggestions for further research in the topic. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
As we will see in this section, given its importance, Divided Government has 
received widespread attention from the academics, which tackled the topic in a wide 
array of manners. Thus, firstly, this section will contain some definitions and 
clarifications that are crucial to understand the topic in discussion. Later, the most 
relevant theories and studies will be shown, always giving special attention to the 
specific contribution each study has brought to this topic and what is its impact for 
my investigation.   
 
 
2.1. Relevant definitions for the topic 
 
Firstly, it is important to provide an overview about the U.S. political system 
and clarify some terms that may not be familiar, since the American political 
system has its own specificities which are, sometimes, quite different from the 
majority of the western systems.  
The American system of government began in 1776. Even though it is often 
categorized as a democracy, it can be more accurately defined as a 
constitutional federal republic. “Constitutional” because the government is 
based on a Constitution ratified in 1788 (with only 27 amendments ever since) 
that defines three separate branches of government (legislative, executive and 
judicial), their powers and the way positions in each of them are to be filled 
(usually known as a “system of checks and balances”). “Federal” because there 
is both national government and governments in each of the 50 states that 
make up the United States of America. And “republic” due to the fact that it is 
a form in which the people hold the power but elect representatives to exercise 
it. 
Regarding the Legislative Branch, The Congress, it is comprised of two 
chambers: The Senate (also known as “Upper Chamber”) and the House of 
Representatives (also, known as “The House of the People”). The one hundred 
senators, two from each state, serve for six-year terms, but since they are 
divided in three classes (and one of the classes stands for elections every two 
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years), the Senate changes every two years. The House of Representatives, in 
which all the 435 representatives, apportioned according to the population 
(each representative is elected for each congressional district), serve a two-year 
term. These chambers share broad legislative powers and it is very important 
to understand that legislation must pass both houses before it is presented to 
the President to be signed into law. Therefore, we can only consider that the 
government is unified in cases in which the totality of the Congress (both 
chambers) is dominated by the party of the President. 
The Executive Branch, headed by The President, serves a four-year term and 
has a set of constitutional (such as the appointment of Supreme Court justices, 
of its Cabinet, command the military forces, negotiate international treaties, 
etc.) and informal (such as establishing innovative programs, offices and 
commissions to carry out the President’s agenda, etc.) powers. 
The Judicial Branch (Supreme Court and the lower federal courts) is 
responsible for judging cases that require interpretation of acts of Congress as 
well as other cases in which the defendant is accused of violation the federal 
law. They have extensive jurisdiction powers over state laws, and cases 
involving more than one state or foreign parties.  
Notwithstanding, for this dissertation whenever “government” is mentioned, it 
will only be referring to two of the three branches: Legislative (the Congress) 
and Executive (the President). Thus, in this dissertation whether a government 
is divided or not is defined in a simple binomial system, in which the 
Congress, as mentioned before, is considered dominated by one party when 
both Houses are controlled by the same party. 
Another aspect that is obviously relevant to define, is the concept of “divided and 
unified government”. Thus, according to D. Menefee-Libey (1991, pp. 643), 
divided government “is where a partisan conflict exists between the executive and 
legislative branches”. Obviously, a unified government is where such conflict does 
not exist. In this study, as mentioned before, the Divided or Unified feature may be 
systematized through a binomial system. The reason is twofold: First, we are only 
taking into account two of the three government branches, Executive and 
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Legislative; secondly, even though the Legislative branch is comprised of two 
chambers, they both have its mechanisms to prevent legislation from being signed 
into law from the President, and so the unified government is only achieved in case 
both chambers are controlled by the same party. Thus, the Congress must be treated 
as a single entity. Notwithstanding, along this study we propose two different 
classifications of the government status, depending on the party and on the number 
of chambers controlled by the president. These specifications are thoroughly 
explained later, on the section concerning the empirical estimation itself. 
 
 
2.2. Main theories 
 
This work intends to verify or negate empirically whether divided government (as 
opposed to a unified one) may be responsible for a different level of political risk, 
in the United States of America. Thus, it is crucial to discuss what is the current 
state of the art and if there is a consensus, at a theoretical level. So, in this 
subsection, we will start by succinctly enumerate some studies showing that Politics 
and Financial Markets are intrinsically connected. We will resume by giving an 
overview of the ancestral discussion that led to the current antagonism between 
Divided and Unified government, discuss the antagonism itself and then, given its 
importance, analyze how the governments’ status may lead to different levels of 
markets’ volatility. 
2.2.1. Politics and stock markets – A hand in hand relation 
 
There is extensive literature showing that politics and stock markets go hand in 
hand. Be it a specific event, such as election, or any other kind of uncertainty, 
political information tends to spill over to financial markets, across all the asset 
classes. In a general fashion, several authors show that political factors, may affect 
both the returns and the risk of financial assets (Gemmil, 1992; Pantzalis et al, 
2000). Yet, the most common kind of study targets the financial consequences of 
political events, usually elections. Riley and Luksetich (1980) and Herbst and 
Slinkman (1984) show that “price changes have generally been found to be negative 
before presidential elections, and positive following elections” suggesting that 
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“elections are an important source of uncertainty to the market”. Nippani and 
Medlin (2002), Nippani and Arize (2005) and Goodell and Bodey (2012) among 
others study the impact of U.S. presidential elections on the stock market and 
support that “the uncertainty (…) is reflected on stock prices”. There are even some 
authors suggesting that, in the last decades, “US stock prices closely followed the 4-
year Presidential Election Cycle” (Wong and McAleer, 2009).  
2.2.2. Government status – The discussion and its roots  
 
According to Coleman (1999), the dispute over the impacts of unified and divided 
government in the United States stems from a discussion that has been taking place 
in the literature since the World War II, which tries to understand the production of 
public policy in the United States. As stated by the author, along the way, the 
discussion has evolved, shifting its focus from a subject to another. While in the 
1940s and 1950s, the academics believed that the constitutional structure and the 
natural decentralization of parties (Schattschneider, 1942), were the major cause of 
the inconsistent and fragmented policymaking process, in the 1960s the focus was 
in topics such as “interest group liberalism” and limited democratic access. 
Following the developments of the sixties, the seventies brought up concern, not 
only in the American case but also across most of the Western democracies, that the 
interest groups may have become so important, that led to a “governability crisis” 
that could only be solved imposing restrictions to the policymaking system 
(Huntington, 1975). Yet, in the 1980s, given the increasingly common occurrence 
of divided governments, the emergence of the government status as an important 
factor to explain policy production happened naturally, by the hand of authors such 
as Cutler (1980) and Sundquist (1988). 
Regarding the specific discussion on Divided Government and its expected impact 
on the market’s volatility, at a theoretical level, the literature provides no consensus. 
Thus, according to Kim et al. (pp. 197), “the balancing model (Fiorina, 1991) 
assumes that divided government leads political actors to compromise on moderate 
policies and predicts that it greatly enlarges the set of policy alternatives and, 
consequently, increases policy risk, comparing to a unified government where one 
party determines policy”. On the other hand, as defended by Brady (1993) and 
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Fowler (2006) “the gridlock theory predicts that divided governments are 
susceptible to stalemate and gridlock” which substantially restricts the range of 
possible policies, leading then to a decrease in terms of policy risk and 
consequently stock market volatility. This is because, under a divided government, 
the status quo is more likely to prevail. 
2.2.3. From the government status to the stock market volatility  
 
To understand how the relation goes from government status to the market, it is 
important to understand what could be the main drivers that cause a different level 
of political risk as a consequence of having a divided government. Those drivers, 
according to the way through which they have an impact, may be divided in two 
main segments: economic and political. Both have been attracting the attention of 
several researchers and thus, in this subsection, we will be addressing the most 
important studies in each of the segments. 
Regarding the economic consequences of divided government, we may say that 
there is a consensus that divided governments have, at least, a different economic 
outcome towards the economy when compared to unified governments. Karol 
(2000) studied the impact of divided governments on the liberalization of the U.S. 
trade policy and concluded that divided governments may have an influence on 
trade, even though “the key is the strength of protectionist forces in Congress, and 
not the divided government itself”. Also, regarding budget policies for the case of 
the United States, Alt and Lowry (1994, pp.823) show that “divided government 
matters, institutions matter, and party control matter”, because “states with split 
legislatures adjust less, regardless of the legal situation, in large part because 
divided legislatures do not appear to adjust revenues in response to surpluses and 
deficits”. Poterba (1994, pp. 815) reinforces this and, additionally, states that 
unified governments “adjust more quickly to unexpected deficit shocks than do 
divided governments and unified governments make most of their adjustment with 
tax changes and do so to a greater extent than split government”, and thus “deficit 
reduction in the U.S. is lower under divided government”. Accordingly, Roubini 
and Sachs (1989) found that unified governments tend to respond more quickly to 
income shocks and thus, divided governments “have been less effective in reducing 
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the budget deficit than have stable and majority-party governments”. Lohmann and 
O’Halloran (1994, pp. 627-28), studied the “effect of domestic conflicts and 
political institutions on trade policy” and concluded that “domestic political 
divisions and the institutions they foster have significant impact on international 
trade policy”. Also in terms of inflation there are studies showing that the inflation 
risk tends to be lower in times when the president does not have control on the 
Congress (Fowler, 2006). 
In what concerns the second set of factors (political factors) through which divided 
government may result in a different level of political risk, there is a lower level of 
consensus: while some, such as Mayhew (1991) and Baumgartner et al. (2014), 
advocate that there is no relevant difference between law production between 
divided and unified government (“On average, about as many major laws passed 
per Congress under divided control as under unified control”), there are some others 
that disagree. In fact, there are some authors that believe that analyzing successful 
legislation could lead to biased inferences. For instance, Edwards et al. (1997) 
suggest that the probability of important legislation failing to pass increases about 
45% under divided Government. Moreover, authors such as Bond and Fleisher 
(1990) and Edwards (1989) argue that the number of members in Congress who 
share the president’s partisanship is the best predictor of whether presidents pass 
their programs or not.  
An additional way that could boost the relationship between government status and 
the market’s volatility is the presidential attitude, which is, naturally, expected to be 
different under divided and unified government. According to Nicholson et al 
(2002, pp. 702-05) “a divided government context has the effect of increasing 
presidential approval relative to periods of unified government”, since it is an 
opportunity for presidents to help themselves in the public arena. This is due to two 
aspects: first, when it comes to presidential evaluations “blame is more critical than 
credit” which is congruent with the definition of Negativity Bias: “greater weight 
given to negative information, relative to equally extreme and equally likely 
positive information in a variety of information-processing tasks” (Lau, 1985); and 
second, divided government “muddies the informational waters by offering citizens 
two potential targets of blame for policies”. On the other hand, in an unified 
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government context “the president bears the full weight of negative evaluations”, 
leading then to an asymmetric environment in which presidents “benefit far more 
from sharing blame than they lose by sharing credit”. This could induce presidents 
to take higher risks under divided government comparatively to when there is no 
split party control of the executive and legislative branches. Below it is presented a 
table that recaps some of the most relevant views discussed in this section.      
 
Table 1 – Main theories summary 
Authors Insight/ Conclusion 
Brady (1993), 
Fowler (2006), 
among others 
Fiorina (1991) 
among others 
 
Poterba (1994) 
 
 
Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) 
Fowler (2006), 
among others 
 
Mayhew (1991), 
among others 
Edwards et al 
(1997) 
Divided governments decrease policy risk because they 
are prone to “stalemate and gridlock” (Gridlock’s 
Perspective), reducing the uncertainty in the economy 
and thus the Political Risk. 
Divided government greatly enlarges the set of possible 
policy alternatives, increasing then political risk 
(Balancing Model). 
Unified governments “adjust more quickly to 
unexpected deficit shocks”. Also, deficit reduction is 
lower under divided governments. 
Unified governments tend to respond more quickly to 
income shocks. 
Inflation risk tends to be higher under divided 
government. 
 
There is no relevant difference between law production 
between divided and unified government. 
The probability of important legislation failing to pass 
increases about 45% under divided Government. 
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2.3. Similar studies 
 
Even though the subject is very relevant and widely discussed in the literature, not 
only recently but mainly from the 1990 onwards, there are not many studies that can 
be defined as similar to the study we propose. Yet, there are three studies worth 
mentioning and explaining, since they provide the basis and highlight the relevance 
of conducting this study. 
 The first one was conducted by Bechtel and Füss (2008, pp. 288-89), for the 
German case. They “empirically evaluate whether divided government reduces 
policy risk on financial markets using daily German stock market data from 1970to 
2005”. The authors originally assumed the gridlock theory as their hypothesis and 
managed to prove it correct for the German case. Thus, their conclusion was that, 
“divided government has a volatility reducing effect on the German stock market”. 
Another study that must be mentioned, is the one conducted by Kim et al. (2012), 
for the American case. Even though this study tackles a slightly different topic, we 
can consider it to be strictly related to the topic of the present study. The authors 
studied the impact of the alignment of each state governor and the federal 
government in the firms’ stock returns. They concluded that “the political 
geography has a pervasive effect on the cross section of stock returns” suggesting 
that proximity to political power has a significant effect on stock returns, both in 
terms of raw returns and on a risk-adjusted basis. According to the authors, this is 
due to the fact that political proximity brings higher uncertainty regarding future 
policies, exposing then those firms to higher policy risk. This highly enforces the 
relevance of the present study by demonstrating the importance of geographical and 
political proximity between firms and political power. Thus, this clarifies the 
necessity of a deeper understanding of this phenomenon and what are the 
mechanisms behind how divided government impacts the business world. 
Additionally, there is a third study for the French case conducted by Lebbos, T. J. 
(2016). The author studied the impact of divided government in the French stock 
market from 1967 until 2015, and contrarily to what Bechtel and Füss (2008) found 
for the German case, he concluded that “having a divided government contributes to 
an increase in the stock market volatility” thus refuting the gridlock theory and 
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supporting Fiorina’s (1992) Balancing Model. In the following table, for the sake of 
an easier reading, it is provided a succinct summary of the abovementioned 
comparable studies. 
 
Table 2 – Similar studies summary 
Authors Insight/ Conclusion 
Bechtel and Fuss 
(2008) 
Kim, Pantzalis and 
Park (2008) 
 
Lebbos, T. (2016) 
Divided Government has a volatility reducing effect on 
the German stock market. 
The political geography has a pervasive effect on the 
cross section of stock returns. Proximity to political 
power has a significant effect on the stock returns. 
Having a divided government contributes to an increase 
in the stock market volatility. 
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3.  Data 
 
In order to evaluate whether the status of the government is systematically 
associated with a different level of policy risk, we use data from 1950 until 2007. 
Comparing to similar studies, such as the already mentioned Füss and Bechtel 
(2008), who covers 35 years, and Lebbos (2016), who covers 48 years, this can be 
considered a long-time span. Notwithstanding, in terms of explanatory and control 
variables, this study will follow, in general, the two studies mentioned above.   
 
3.1. Stock market prices and volatility data 
  
First, the stock market index used to perform this analysis was the S&P 500. This is 
due to the fact that this index is widely regarded as the best single gauge of large-
cap equities for the United States, providing thus an accurate overview of the U.S. 
economy. Given the nature of this analysis, this is clearly the best alternative. Even 
though this index was created in the 4th of March of 1957, given its extensive use 
and clear selection criteria, there is available the computation of its performance 
prior to 1957, which enables my analysis to start in 1950. The data was retrieved 
from Thomson Reuters DataStream (DataStream, 2016) and from Quandl. In this 
study we collected close prices, which were afterwards converted to a return series 
through the following formula: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−1,  
Then, since the relevant market variable for my study is the volatility and not 
returns, the daily standard deviation was computed for each of the years that 
compose the sample. This approach was chosen because the other standard measure 
used in the literature, the 20-day standard deviation, has a smoothing effect which 
would not be, naturally, advantageous. Additionally, since volatilities are normally 
quoted in annualized terms, we annualized it through the application of the 
following formula:  
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣. = 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.∗ √252 
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The following graph provides an overview of the historical evolution of the S&P 
500 in terms of volatility:  
Figure 1 – S&P 500 volatility (annualized standard deviation) 
 
 
The volatility data set has a mean of 0.1329 and a standard deviation of 0.0511. The 
maximum shown in the figure below, 0.3373, and the minimum, 0.0526, concern to 
the years of 1987 and 1964, respectively. Additionally, the most relevant 
descriptive stats are also provided below. 
 
Figure 2 – Volatility’s histogram and descriptive stats 
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Yet, as already explained before the main explanatory variable in this study is a 
dummy variable, which is set to 1 in the case of a divided government (cases in 
which the political party of the President does not control both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives), and 0 otherwise. So, to gather a first graphical 
impression of how different the volatility is under both status, we use the following 
box-plot complemented with the most relevant descriptive stats. It is also important 
to point out that, from 1950 until 2007 divided government is the predominant 
status of government (35 years, against 23 years of unified governments) as it is 
clear in the descriptive stats provided below. 
Figure 3 – S&P 500’s volatility according to government status 
 
At the naked eye, it looks like, from 1950 to 2007, the volatility has been clearly 
higher in times of divided government, which is statistically confirmed by an 
Welch's unequal variances t-test (to the mean, p < 0.00031) and by an Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test (to the median, p < 0.0008).  
Obviously, understanding the relationship between the government status and the 
stock market volatility requires a more sophisticated model, in which we consider 
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several other variables that may, by itself, have an impact on the relationship we are 
studying.  
3.2. Political data on the U.S. government status 
 
Regarding the data related to the status of the U.S. government, from 1950 until 
2007, we used a database that was constructed by Baumgartner et al (2014), and 
double checked it against the institutional information provided by the website of 
each of the American governmental branches (https://www.senate.gov, 
http://www.house.gov and https://www.whitehouse.gov). In this database, there is 
not only information on who controls each branch, from the 82nd until the 109th 
Congress, but also the extent of that control (number of seats per party in both the 
Senate and the House) among other variables that are discussed in the subsection 
relative to the control variables. Shortly, as it was already explained before, from 
this data we build a dummy variable, equaling 1 in case of divided government and 
0 otherwise. This variable is the main explanatory variable.  
3.3. Control variables 
 
As mentioned before, to examine if there is a systematic influence of the 
government status on the volatility we must develop an appropriate model including 
a set of control variables allowing us to mitigate the effects of other variables, and 
thus, better understand the relationship between our dependent variable, volatility, 
and the explanatory variable, government status. In this regard, the set of control 
variables use in this study may naturally be divided in two groups: political and 
economic/ financial. While some are straightforward and obvious, since they are 
standard in financial literature, others may not be that much familiar, but they are, 
notwithstanding, of extreme importance to this topic. Therefore, in this subsection, 
we will present and explain the rationale for each of the control variables.  
Firstly, in what concerns the set of economic/ financial variables, in this study we 
control for the United States’ GDP growth rate. This data was retrieved from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis – Department of Commerce (https://www.bea.gov). 
Secondly, we account for inflation and the federal deficit (as a % of GDP). Both 
data sets were retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(https://www.stlouisfed.org), which is one of the twelve Reserve Banks that make 
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up the FED, the American central bank. As mentioned before, these variables are 
standard control variables in the fields of political and financial economics, since by 
itself they represent the overall performance of an economy and thus, their impact 
on financial markets’ volatility is undeniable. The last control variable is a financial 
one and intends to pick up effects from major events in the financial markets. This 
is due to the existence of huge peaks in terms of volatility, that are, naturally, not 
accountable to the political situation of the United States. Thus, we create a dummy 
that equals 1 in the top decile of annual volatility. This allows to control for years 
such as 1974 (first oil shock), 1987 (Black Monday) and 2002 (dot com bubble), in 
which financial markets witnessed distress situations not necessarily related to the 
status of the U.S. government. 
Included in the second set, abovementioned as political variables, there are two 
control variables that are related to the political situation, trying thus to assess the 
depth of the union or division of the government, from two different angles: 
1. Distance 
This feature refers to the ideological distance between the majority and the 
opposition during divided government, in the House of Representatives. It can be 
seen as a deeper concept of divided government, in order to reach to a higher level 
of understanding of the magnitude of certain government control circumstances by 
assessing how far, in terms of ideology, the government and the opposition are 
(Baumgartner et al, 2014).  
2. Cohesiveness  
Cohesiveness, on the other hand, is a feature that refers to the ideological distance 
within the majority in times of unified government, within the House of 
Representatives. In other words, cohesiveness assesses the intra-majority 
ideological distance. Mathematically, it is the standard deviation from the weighted 
mean of the ideological position of the governing party. The weighted mean is 
computed as follows: 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑊𝑀) =
∑ 𝐼𝑝𝑖 ∗
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑝𝑖
∑ 𝑀𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
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Where: 
• 𝐼𝑝𝑖is the ideological position of the party; 
• 𝑀𝑝𝑖is the number of seats held by the party i. 
 
So, cohesiveness is calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = √
1
∑ 𝑀𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑(𝐼𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
− 𝑊𝑀)2 
 
Both these variables were built by Baumgartner et al (2014), based on Bailey’s 
(2007) ideal point estimates. Unfortunately, these variables are only available up 
until 1999, and thus, from 2000 onwards we will not be able to control for these 
effects. It is important to understand the reason why we control for both the distance 
and cohesiveness. Both distance and cohesiveness, allow us to mitigate the effects 
of different degrees of unified and divided government, that may be, naturally, very 
distinct. Thus, given that we are trying to assess whether the government status in 
itself has an impact in the market’s volatility or not, we find it advantageous to 
control for these political aspects. 
Moreover, it is also standard in political studies to control for election years. This is 
supported by the literature, since pre-election periods are associated with higher 
policy uncertainty (Pantzalis et. Al, 2000). In the American case, as it was already 
mentioned there are two kinds of elections: Presidential elections, every four years, 
and Congress elections, every two years. It is worth mentioning that even though 
the totality of representatives stands for that election, only one third of the senators 
change from two to two since they serve 6-year mandates. Thus, we use two 
dummy variables to account for both elections. 
3.4. Empirical estimation 
 
In order to empirically test whether the government status has a relevant influence 
in the stock market volatility, we use a standard OLS model. As it has already been 
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mentioned before, this methodology is also used by Bechtel and Fuss and Lebbos. 
Regarding the estimation itself, we try to explain annual volatility, using the 
variables presented before, in a standard OLS model with a HAC 
(heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) Newey-West estimator to 
prevent any issues related to the existence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
among the residuals. That would diminish the quality or even prevent us from a 
meaningful statistical inference. 
 We start with a basic approach, in which we do not apply any control variables. 
Along the way, the specification is improved by the introduction of additional 
variables, allowing us to gather a better understanding of the phenomena at hand. It 
is important to mention that, regarding the two control variables presented above, 
Distance and Cohesiveness, we only have data until 1999. Therefore, to complete 
the more sophisticated estimations (using all the control variables) we had to divide 
the sample in two: the first, from 1950 to 1999, and the second, from 2000 to 2007. 
The models are presented below: 
1. Annual Volatility = α + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
2. Annual Volatility = α + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 
𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 
𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
We were able to apply these models to the entire sample, from 1950 to 2007, given 
that both Cohesiveness and Distance are not used. 
The third model is as follows, and it is applied to the subsample that includes the 
years between 1950 and 1999. 
3. Annual Volatility = α + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 
𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 
𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 
𝛽9𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
Additionally, the model 1 (the simplest), was applied to the second subsample 
(from 2000 to 2007). 
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We also develop a different specification of divided and unified government. Thus, 
three possibilities of government status were considered: unified government 
(President plus both chambers), weak divided (President plus one chamber against 
the other chamber) and strong divided (President against both chambers). In these 
models, we do not control for the existence of crash years since the dummy variable 
abovementioned raised concerns of multicollinearity, decreasing then the quality of 
the second of the following models. This specification origins two models, model 4 
a) and b), specified in the following manner: 
4.  
a. Annual Volatility = α + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 
𝛽2𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
b. Annual Volatility = α + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 
𝛽2𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 
𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
Additionally, to enhance the quality of the analysis, we develop two additional 
models. With these models, we intend to discover whether the feature “political 
party” is of high relevance in the question at hand or not. It could be the case that, 
times of higher (or lower) volatility are intrinsically related to a specific President’s 
party, and not necessarily related to the government status. In the first model, since 
we only intend to understand if there is any relationship between annual volatility 
and the president’s party, the government status is not considered as a variable. In 
the second one, we study if there is any relevant difference in cases of democratic 
and republican unified governments. So, we take both aspects into account: 
presidential party and government status. The models are as follows: 
5. Annual Volatility = α + 𝛽1𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+ 
𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡  + 
𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
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6.  
a. Annual Volatility = α + 𝛽1𝐷𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 + 
𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 
b. Annual Volatility = α + 𝛽1𝐷𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 + 
𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 
𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
 
Shortly, and for the sake of clarity, using these models we intend to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Does the status of the United States government have an impact in the 
stock’s market volatility? 
2. If so, does stock market volatility increase or decrease in times of divided 
government? 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we present and explain all the relevant results concerning the 
abovementioned models. The first two models, as mentioned before, concern the 
whole sample (1950 to 2007). The remaining models are applied to the subsamples 
(1950-99 and 2000-07).  
 
4.1. Main models’ results 
 
Firstly, regarding the simplest model, its main results are displayed in the table 3, 
below. We can see that the model is globally significant at a 99.5% of significance 
(F-statistic p-value < 0.002). Also, the explanatory variable is significantly different 
from zero at virtually any confidence level, and indicates that under divided 
government, the stock market’s volatility (annualized) is expected to be about 4.3% 
higher than in times of unified government. 
In what concerns to the second model (Model 2, in the previous section), the results 
are in line with the previous ones, but now controlled for the set of economic and 
political variables already explained. Again, the model is globally significant (F-
statistic p-value < 0.0000) as well as the explanatory variable (t-statistic p-value < 
0.009). In this model, we can see that divided governments are, again, expected to 
bring additional volatility to the stock market (about 2.5% higher, comparing to 
times of unified government).  
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Table 3 – Model 1 and 2 results  
Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.106800*** 0.092557*** 
 
Divided Government 
(Dummy) 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP growth rate 
 
Deficit 
 
Crash Year 
 
Presidential Election 
 
Congress Election 
(0.006279) 
0.043295*** 
(0.011920) 
(0.012067) 
0.024993** 
(0.009155) 
0.194019 
(0.127324) 
0.081115 
(0.181166) 
0.263278 
(0.261664) 
0.113130*** 
(0.025232) 
-0.022789 
(0.011986) 
0.008733 
(0.011422) 
N 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
Prob (Wald F-statistic) 
58 
0.175062 
0.160331 
11.88392 
0.001081 
0.000611 
58 
0.638123 
0.587460 
12.59549 
0.000000 
0.000000 
Note: Dependent variable is annual volatility (measured by the annualized standard 
deviation of the S&P500’s daily returns, from 1950 to 2007). Estimates are OLS estimates 
(standard errors, with a HAC Newey-West estimator, in parenthesis). Divided Government, 
the explanatory variable, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the presidential party 
does not control both congressional chambers. Inflation, GDP growth, Deficit and Crash 
Year are variables to control the economic environment. Presidential Election and Congress 
Election are dummy variables to control for election years. ***P<0.001; **P<0.01; 
*P<0.05 
 
The third model concerns the subsample from 1950-1999, and, again, provides 
further indication that times of divided government are associated with higher stock 
market volatility. In this model, divided government are associated with an increase 
of 2.8% of volatility. It is worth to mention that in this case the procedure followed 
was slightly different: it was not used a HAC consistent Newey-West estimator, but 
a White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. This is because, with the HAC 
estimator there were some signs of multicollinearity. Moreover, since we can reject 
the existence of serial correlation but not the existence of heteroskedasticity, this 
procedure allows us to solve the multicollinearity issue without losing the ability to 
proceed with a meaningful statistical inference.  
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Table 4 – Model 3 results 
Variables 
 
Model 3 
Constant 0.098161** 
(0.028243) 
Divided Government (Dummy) 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP growth rate 
 
Deficit 
 
Crash Year 
 
Presidential Election 
 
Congress Election 
 
Distance 
 
Cohesiveness 
0.028632** 
(0.009581) 
0.253839 
(0.191745) 
0.155790 
(0.190675) 
0.112331 
(0.252259) 
0.109287** 
(0.047313) 
-0.025132 
(0.015110) 
0.013102 
(0.014305) 
-0.000228 
(0.010243) 
-0.014630 
(0.026691) 
 
 
N 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 
 
 
50 
0.579089 
0.484384 
6.114655 
0.000023 
0.000027 
Note: Dependent variable is annual volatility (measured by the annualized standard 
deviation of the S&P500’s daily returns, from 1950 to 2007). Estimates are OLS estimates 
(standard errors, with a HC White estimator, in parenthesis). Divided Government, the 
explanatory variable, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the presidential party 
does not control both congressional chambers. Inflation, GDP growth, Deficit and Crash 
Year are variables to control for the economic environment. Presidential Election, Congress 
Election, Distance and Cohesiveness are variables to control for the political environment, 
and already explained in the previous section. ***P<0.001; **P<0.01; *P<0.05 
 
The model presented below, is the first model (Model 1) but now applied to the 
second subsample (2000-2007). Even though this subsample is rather small, the 
results are in line with the ones already mentioned. Times of divided government 
are associated with higher volatility. In this case, the coefficient, which is 
statistically significant at a 99% confidence level, is higher, predicting that divided 
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government is expected to increase annual volatility by 9.33%. Yet given that the 
sample is extremely small, it would not be wise to yield that much importance to 
these results. 
 
Table 5 – Model 1 (2000-2007) results 
Variables 
 
Model 1 
Constant 0.121094*** 
(0.015654) 
Divided Government (Dummy) 0.093332** 
(0.016892) 
 
 
N 
Rsquared 
Adjusted Rsquared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 
 
 
 
8 
0.675891 
0.621873 
12.51230 
0.012259 
0.001480 
 
Note: Dependent variable is annual volatility (measured by the annualized standard 
deviation of the S&P500’s daily returns, from 2000 to 2007). OLS estimates (standard 
errors, with a HAC Newey-West estimator, in parenthesis). Divided Government is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the presidential party does not control both 
congressional chambers. ***P<0.001; **P<0.01; *P<0.05  
 
Regarding the fourth models presented below, in which we use a different 
specification of divided government, the results are also strong and congruent to the 
previous results. Differently, in these models we have two explanatory variables 
(Strong Divided and Weak Divided). Both are positive and significant at a 95% 
confidence level, being the status “weak divided” expected to increase annual 
volatility by 5.5% and 5.8% and “strong divided” by 3.9% and 4.1%, in model a) 
and b) respectively. Note that it would probably be expected that, in line with the 
previous results, a strong division would yield higher uncertainty than a weak 
division. Yet, the classification of “strong” and “weak” is rather ambiguous. In this 
case the classification is assumed from the standpoint of the President (President 
against the chambers). If a distinct perspective was assumed the results would, 
naturally, be switched. Once again, the models are globally significant at a 99.5% 
confidence level, which highly enforces the validity of its results. Note that the 
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dummy that account for crash years is not presented in these two models because it 
raised concerns of multicollinearity.  
Table 6 – Model 4a) and 4b) results 
Variables 
 
Model 4 a)  Model 4 b) 
Constant 0.106800 
(0.006336) 
0.101290*** 
(0.020993) 
Strong Divided Government 
 
Weak Divided Government 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP growth 
 
Deficit 
 
Presidential Election 
 
Congress Election 
0.039592** 
(0.013861) 
0.055793* 
(0.023372) 
0.041207* 
(0.015723) 
0.058647* 
(0.024009) 
0.245608 
(0.164908) 
-0.042936 
(0.242908) 
-0.398692 
(0.466084) 
-0.034010* 
(0.013003) 
0.022639* 
(0.010374) 
 
N 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
Prob (Wald F-statistic) 
 
58 
0.185962 
0.156361 
6.282224 
0.003489 
0.002083 
 
58 
0.284224 
0.184015 
2.836320 
0.014333 
0. 000116 
Note: Dependent variable is annual volatility (measured by the annualized standard 
deviation of the S&P500’s daily returns, from 1950 to 2007). Estimates are OLS estimates 
(standard errors, with a HAC Newey-West estimator, in parenthesis). Strong Divided 
Government is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the presidential party does not 
control any of the congressional chambers. Weak Divided Government takes the value 1 if 
the presidential party controls one, and only one, of the congressional chambers. In the case 
both variables are equal to zero, we are in a situation of Unified Government. Inflation, 
GDP growth and Deficit are variables to control the economic environment. Presidential 
Election and Congress Election are dummy variables to control for election years. 
***P<0.001; **P<0.01; *P<0.05 
 
4.2. Support models’ results 
 
The “support models”, as explained before, are developed to understand if the party 
of the president may be, by itself, responsible for a different level of volatility. In 
the first model, not taking the government status into account, we can conclude that 
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the president’s party does not seem to be, by itself, a driver of market volatility. 
This is because the variable “Democratic President” is not statistically significant, 
so we cannot reject the possibility of the effect being null. 
 
Table 7 – Model 5 results 
Variables 
 
Support Model 5 
Constant 0.113456*** 
(0.011827) 
Democratic President 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP growth 
 
Deficit 
 
Crash Year 
 
Presidential Election 
 
Congress Election 
-0.016137 
(0.009718) 
0.214075 
(0.120304) 
0.086891 
(0.203763) 
0.205621 
(0.253765) 
0.123027*** 
(0.022356) 
-0.018302 
(0.011800) 
0.005660 
(0.012198) 
 
N 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
Prob (Wald F-statistic) 
 
58 
0.607602 
0. 552666 
11.06022 
0.000000 
0. 000000 
Note: Dependent variable is annual volatility (measured by the annualized standard 
deviation of the S&P500’s daily returns, from 1950 to 2007). Estimates are OLS estimates 
(standard errors, with a HAC Newey-West estimator, in parenthesis). Democratic President, 
the explanatory variable, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the president is 
democrat. Inflation, GDP growth, Deficit and Crash Year are variables to control the 
economic environment. Presidential Election and Congress Election are dummy variables 
to control for election years. ***P<0.001;**P<0.01;*P<0.05 
 
Yet, in the second set of support models, both features are considered: government 
status and president’s party. This is accomplished through the construction of a new 
dummy variable that considers three possible states of nature: Divided government, 
unified democratic government and unified republican government. For the sake of 
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congruency, we follow the same approach: we estimate a simple model, in which 
only the explanatory variables are used and then, evolve to a more sophisticated 
model considering the control variables. The models are as follows in table 8: 
 
Table 8 – Model 6a) and 6b) results 
Variables 
 
Support Model 6 a)  Support Model 6 b) 
Constant 
 
0.150095 
(0.011501) 
0.114887 
(0.012320) 
Unified Democrat 
 
Unified Republican 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP growth 
 
Deficit 
 
Crash Year 
 
Presidential Election 
 
Congress Election 
-0.045269** 
(0.013493) 
-0.037701** 
(0.013008) 
-0.028656** 
(0.009673) 
-0.016996 
(0.013748) 
0.232749 
(0.130604) 
0.131065 
(0.193484) 
0.233760 
(0.254958) 
0.112784** 
(0.025660) 
-0.023140 
(0.012003) 
0.009268 
(0.011423) 
 
N 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
Prob (Wald F-statistic) 
 
58 
0.176772 
0.146836 
5.905073 
0.004751 
0.003093 
 
58 
0.641465 
0.582929 
10.95841 
0.000000 
0.000000 
Note: Dependent variable is annual volatility (measured by the annualized standard 
deviation of the S&P500’s daily returns, from 1950 to 2007). Estimates are OLS estimates 
(standard errors, with a HAC Newey-West estimator, in parenthesis). The explanatory 
variables, Unified Democrat and Unified Republican, are dummy variables that take the 
value 1 if both the president and the Congress are democrats or republican, respectively. In 
the case both variables are equal to zero, we are in a situation of Divided Government. 
Inflation, GDP growth, Deficit and Crash Year are variables to control the economic 
environment. Presidential Election and Congress Election are dummy variables to control 
for election years. ***P<0.001; **P<0.01; *P<0.05 
 
Results remain, in general, in line with the previous results. Unified governments 
are clearly associated with times of lower volatility in the stock market. Moreover, 
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in this case we can see the difference between unified democrat and republican. In 
the simplest model, both the variables are statistically significant at a 99% level of 
confidence. Democratic unified governments seem to be associated with the times 
of lowest volatility, with a decrease of 4.5% while republican unified government 
are responsible for a decrease of only 3.7%. Yet, in the case of republican unified 
governments the results are not statistically significant when all the control 
variables are considered. This may be due to the fact that, along the whole sample, 
we only have 6 years of such status, which naturally increases the exigency of the t-
test. Notwithstanding, the dummy “democratic unified government” is still 
significant at a 99% level, allowing us to conclude that, even considering the 
complete set of control variables, we are able to conclude that times of unified 
democratic government are responsible for a decline in market volatility, by 2.87%.  
Overall, the abovementioned set of models show, on a consistent basis, that divided 
governments in the United States are associated with more stock market volatility. 
In the main models, the effect goes from 2.5% to 4.8%. Moreover, the later models 
also show that we can exclude the possibility of such result being driven by the 
difference in the presidential party.  
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5. Discussion 
 
As we could see, the results from this study are quite strong in the way they support 
the argument that times of divided government are associated with higher volatility 
in the stock market. Yet, when we compare to the abovementioned studies, this 
study is in line with the results found in the French (Lebbos, 2016) case but 
conflicting with the conclusions of the study for the German case (Bechtel and 
Füss, 2008). So, shortly, the present study does not validate the gridlock hypothesis, 
at least for the American case.  
A possible explanation for this set of results is the fact that, under divided 
governments, investors are less capable of comprehending the overall political 
agenda, since there are two different agents trying to set the tone in political terms. 
This is in line with the views of Baumgartner et al (2014), when they state that the 
rate at which laws are made and implemented does not vary by government status. 
Thus, in cases of divided government, ceteris paribus, we will have a wider range 
(in a left-right spectrum) of policies being crafted.    
Another way of explaining these results is based on the research of Nicholson et al. 
(2002), that relates the President approval rating with the government status. 
According to the authors, divided government “provides ambiguous and conflicting 
information about which branch of government to hold accountable for government 
performance”. Moreover, their study proofs that the “presidents are punished more 
heavily for negative outcomes than they are rewarded for favourable ones”1 and so 
their approval ratings tend to be higher under divided governments. Thus, under 
divided government president should “benefit far more from sharing blame than 
they lose by sharing credit”. This argument, in the case that presidents are aware of 
this asymmetry, could lead presidents under divided government to take additional 
risks in terms of policy, which would materialize in higher levels of market 
volatility. 
  
                                                          
1 This is congruent with the concept of “negativity bias”, which was defined by Lau (1985) as the “greater 
weight given to negative information relative to equally extreme and equally likely information”. 
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6. Robustness Tests 
 
To gather an understanding on the robustness of the abovementioned models, and 
consequently on the validity of the results themselves, we subject the models to 
econometric tests. For the sake of simplicity, in this chapter, we present the validity 
tests to the main models. Thus, to clarify, in this section we will present tests 
concerning the following models: Model 1 and 2; Model 4a) and 4b); and Model 
6a) and 6b).  Regarding the additional models, whenever needed, we will present 
the tests in the appendix. Firstly, we follow the standard procedure in similar 
literature. Yet, we also try to build up on that and adapt the available tools to this 
specific work. Shortly, we run tests on topics such as omitted variables, 
autocorrelation and multicollinearity. 
 
6.1.Omitted variables  
 
The first step to understand whether the model used is well specified or not, for the 
topic at hand, we start by applying a standard Ramsey Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test (RESET). The results are as follows: 
 
Table 9 – Ramsey’s RESET results 
 Prob > F Result 
Model 1 N/A N/A 
Model 2 0.6935 Cannot reject 𝐻0  
Model 4a) N/A N/A 
Model 4b) 0.5427 Cannot reject 𝐻0 
Model 6a) N/A N/A 
Model 6b) 0.5556 Cannot reject 𝐻0 
Note: In Models 1, 4a) and 6a) Ramsey’s RESET Test cannot be performed since the only 
explanatory variables are dummy variables. 𝐻0: Model has no omitted variables. 
 
From these results, we can say that none of the abovementioned models suffers 
from functional misspecification, with a high degree of confidence. 
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6.2.Autocorrelation  
 
Even though all the models were estimated with a HAC Newey-West that enables 
the statistical inference in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, it 
is important to understand whether we have a high degree of serial correlation in the 
main models, as it sometimes happens with time series data, or not. 
We first use a standard Durbin-Watson test, to assess if there is autocorrelation of 
first order (following AR1 processes), and the results are as follows: 
Table 10 – Durbin-Watson test’s results 
 DW Stat 
Critical Stat 
Result 
dL dU 
Model 1 1.2534 1.356 1.428 Reject 𝐻0 
Model 2 1.8766 1.134 1.685 Cannot Reject 𝐻0 
Model 4a) 1.3262 1.320 1.466 Inconclusive 
Model 4b) 1.3950 1.134 1.685 Inconclusive 
Model 6a) 1.2713 1.320 1.466 Reject 𝐻0 
Model 6b) 1.9238 1.095 1.734 Cannot reject 𝐻0 
Note: 𝐻0: Residuals are not autocorrelated. Critical intervals are at a 1% significance level.  
 
Firstly, it is important to reinforce that all the models were estimated using a 
Newey-West HAC estimator that allows statistical inference even in cases of serial 
correlation. Notwithstanding, it is also important to point out that only in the 
simplest models we reject the null hypothesis. Those models have only one dummy 
or a pair of dummies as explanatory variables. In the core models [Models 2, 4b) 
and 6b)], the ones with all the control variables, we either reject the autocorrelation 
hypothesis or the test is inconclusive. So, to better assess the issue, we perform a 
more sophisticated test. So, since the Breusch-Godfrey test only has asymptotical 
validity (its results are not valid for relatively small samples, as it is this case), we 
run a Ljung-Box Test, with two lags, for all the six abovementioned models. The 
results are as follows: 
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Table 11 – Ljung-Box test’s results 
 
 
Prob > F 
(1st lag) 
Result (x=1) 
Prob > F 
(2nd Lag) 
Result (x=2) 
Model 1 0.004 Reject 𝐻0 0.017 Reject 𝐻0 
Model 2 0.77 Accept 𝐻0 0.924 Accept 𝐻0 
Model 4a) 0.01 Accept 𝐻0 0.04 Accept 𝐻0 
Model 4b) 0.007 Reject 𝐻0 0.022 Accept 𝐻0 
Model 6a) 0.005 Reject 𝐻0 0.021 Accept 𝐻0 
Model 6b) 0.92 Accept 𝐻0 0.94 Accept 𝐻0 
Note: 𝐻0: There is no autocorrelation of x
th order, being x 1 and 2. Results are drawn upon a 
1% significance level.  
 
So, as we can see, most of the models do not suffer from autocorrelation issues. 
Only Model 1, has the issue for both the lag 1 and lag 2. In the other models, 4b) 
and 6a), the problem is concerning the first lag only.    
 
6.3.Multicollinearity 
 
Regarding the multicollinearity, we resort on Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). Yet, 
it is important to mention that, along the dissertation we have already dealt with 
multicollinearity issues, and thus the most problematic variables were already 
excluded from the specific models, as mentioned in the proper chapter. 
Notwithstanding, the multicollinearity tests are as follows: 
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Table 12 – Variance Inflated Factors test’s results 
 
VIF 
β1 
VIF 
β2 
VIF 
β3 
VIF 
β4 
VIF 
β5 
VIF 
β6 
VIF 
β7 
VIF 
β8 
Result 
Model 
1 
- - - - - - - - - 
Model 
2 
1.65 1.95 3.21 3.38 4.24 4.27 1.66 - 
Cannot 
reject 
𝐻0  
Model 
4a) 
- - - - - - - - - 
Model 
4b) 
1.33 2.56 1.66 3.06 2.29 2.31 1.87 - 
Cannot 
reject 
𝐻0 
Model 
6a) 
- - - - - - - - - 
Model 
6b) 
2.18 3.54 1.81 2.14 1.35 3.35 4.69 4.50 
Cannot 
reject 
𝐻0 
Note: The threshold used in this test is the standard value in the literature: as it is usually 
considered, multicollinearity issues are raised when VIF stats are above 5 for one or more 
variables. Also, in the simplest models, since they are composed by one (or two) dummy 
variables, it would be meaningless to test for multicollinearity.   
 
As it can be seen in the table above, there are no extreme multicollinearity issues in 
the models. There are no signs of collinearity between variables that would decrease 
the meaning of the coefficient estimated.   
Overall, the models are robust enough so we can draw strong conclusions regarding 
the topic. Nevertheless, we need to be cautious when it comes to drawing 
conclusions with some models. This is because, as we have seen, there are some 
signs of autocorrelation. Yet, the fact that the models were estimated under the 
HAC estimator lets us prosecute a meaningful and strong statistical inference. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
To sum up, this work intends to shed some light on an interesting problematic that 
have caught some, but not extreme, attention of the literature. As it was shown in 
the literature review, there are innumerous ways through which the government 
status may have an impact in the economy and, consequently, the financial markets. 
Moreover, as we have two conflicting views this study is imperative to understand 
what is the prevailing effect in the American case. 
In this study, we find that having a divided government (Congress and President, 
controlled by different parties) leads to an increase of stock market volatility. Thus, 
for the United States, we can say that we found evidence that the gridlock theory 
does not hold. Taking this insight into consideration, helps gathering a deeper 
understanding of the stock market and its patterns, as well as in the decision-making 
process of investors and voters.  
We believe our findings carry implications to the future research on the field. Thus, 
given the robustness of these results, we believe that the government status should, 
from now on, be considered as a relevant factor when it comes to study capital 
markets related topics. 
Moreover, bearing in mind the results of this study, further research in the field of 
Politics and Financial Markets must try to further comprehend this phenomenon. 
Firstly, given that different results are reached for different countries, it is important 
to understand what are the underlying drivers of a different level of volatility due to 
the government status. Is it a matter of investors’ perception, and thus impacted by 
the culture of the country, or is it a matter of the specific political framework in 
which the country operates on? Secondly, for the specific case of the United States 
it would also be interesting to decompose this relationship in distinct categories to 
understand what is the impact of the government status in different industries, 
across different decades and in the recent years. Also, given the strength of these 
results, it would be interesting to ascertain whether government status-oriented 
asset allocations are able to yield abnormal returns or not.   
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Model 1 and Model 2 output 
 
 
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 04/27/17   Time: 15:51  
Sample: 1950 2007   
Included observations: 58  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.106800 0.006279 17.00857 0.0000 
DIV_DUMMY 0.043295 0.011920 3.632113 0.0006 
     
     R-squared 0.175062     Mean dependent var 0.132926 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160331     S.D. dependent var 0.051061 
S.E. of regression 0.046789     Akaike info criterion -3.252482 
Sum squared resid 0.122594     Schwarz criterion -3.181432 
Log likelihood 96.32197     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.224806 
F-statistic 11.88392     Durbin-Watson stat 1.253396 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001081     Wald F-statistic 13.19225 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000611    
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 05/03/17   Time: 17:00  
Sample: 1950 2007   
Included observations: 58  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.092557 0.012067 7.670377 0.0000 
DIV_DUMMY 0.024993 0.009155 2.729832 0.0087 
INFLATION 0.194019 0.127324 1.523822 0.1339 
DUMMY_YEAR_CRASH 0.113130 0.025232 4.483552 0.0000 
DEFICIT 0.263278 0.261664 1.006171 0.3192 
PRESELEC_DUMMY -0.022789 0.011986 -1.901265 0.0630 
CONGELEC_DUMMY 0.008733 0.011422 0.764587 0.4481 
GDP_GR 0.081115 0.181166 0.447739 0.6563 
     
     R-squared 0.638123     Mean dependent var 0.132926 
Adjusted R-squared 0.587460     S.D. dependent var 0.051061 
S.E. of regression 0.032796     Akaike info criterion -3.869588 
Sum squared resid 0.053778     Schwarz criterion -3.585389 
Log likelihood 120.2181     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.758887 
F-statistic 12.59549     Durbin-Watson stat 1.876628 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Wald F-statistic 11.11614 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Annex 2: Model 3 output 
 
 
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 06/10/17   Time: 18:27  
Sample: 1950 1999   
Included observations: 50  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.098161 0.029078 3.375797 0.0016 
DIV_DUMMY 0.028632 0.009464 3.025220 0.0043 
COHESION -0.014630 0.026105 -0.560431 0.5783 
DISTANCE -0.000228 0.010062 -0.022634 0.9821 
INFLATION 0.253839 0.164899 1.539355 0.1316 
DUMMY_YEAR_CRASH 0.109287 0.047409 2.305190 0.0264 
DEFICIT 0.112331 0.252051 0.445666 0.6582 
PRESELEC_DUMMY -0.025132 0.016145 -1.556567 0.1275 
CONGELEC_DUMMY 0.013102 0.014303 0.916012 0.3652 
GDP_GR 0.155790 0.178743 0.871586 0.3886 
     
     R-squared 0.579089     Mean dependent var 0.127353 
Adjusted R-squared 0.484384     S.D. dependent var 0.047718 
S.E. of regression 0.034265     Akaike info criterion -3.732550 
Sum squared resid 0.046963     Schwarz criterion -3.350146 
Log likelihood 103.3138     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.586928 
F-statistic 6.114655     Durbin-Watson stat 1.934390 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000023     Wald F-statistic 8.367573 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000001    
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Annex 3: Model 1 (2000-07) output 
 
 
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 05/01/17   Time: 15:58  
Sample: 2000 2007   
Included observations: 8  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 3.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.121094 0.015654 7.735889 0.0002 
DIV_DUMMY 0.093332 0.016892 5.525088 0.0015 
     
     R-squared 0.675891     Mean dependent var 0.167760 
Adjusted R-squared 0.621873     S.D. dependent var 0.060682 
S.E. of regression 0.037314     Akaike info criterion -3.526559 
Sum squared resid 0.008354     Schwarz criterion -3.506699 
Log likelihood 16.10624     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.660509 
F-statistic 12.51230     Durbin-Watson stat 0.804385 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.012259     Wald F-statistic 30.52660 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.001480    
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Annex 4: Model 4 a) and 4 b) output 
 
 
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 05/03/17   Time: 17:00  
Sample: 1950 2007   
Included observations: 58  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.106800 0.006336 16.85603 0.0000 
STRONGDIVIDED 0.039592 0.013861 2.856273 0.0060 
WEAKDIVIDED 0.055793 0.023372 2.387160 0.0204 
     
     R-squared 0.185962     Mean dependent var 0.132926 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156361     S.D. dependent var 0.051061 
S.E. of regression 0.046899     Akaike info criterion -3.231300 
Sum squared resid 0.120974     Schwarz criterion -3.124726 
Log likelihood 96.70770     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.189787 
F-statistic 6.282224     Durbin-Watson stat 1.326231 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003489     Wald F-statistic 6.921989 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.002083    
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 05/24/17   Time: 15:08  
Sample: 1950 2007   
Included observations: 58  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.101290 0.020993 4.824915 0.0000 
STRONGDIVIDED 0.041207 0.015723 2.620874 0.0116 
WEAKDIVIDED 0.058647 0.024009 2.442672 0.0182 
INFLATION 0.245608 0.164908 1.489365 0.1427 
DEFICIT -0.398692 0.466084 -0.855409 0.3964 
PRESELEC_DUMMY -0.034010 0.013003 -2.615585 0.0117 
CONGELEC_DUMMY 0.022639 0.010374 2.182292 0.0338 
GDP_GR -0.042936 0.242908 -0.176756 0.8604 
     
     R-squared 0.284224     Mean dependent var 0.132926 
Adjusted R-squared 0.184015     S.D. dependent var 0.051061 
S.E. of regression 0.046124     Akaike info criterion -3.187525 
Sum squared resid 0.106371     Schwarz criterion -2.903326 
Log likelihood 100.4382     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.076824 
F-statistic 2.836320     Durbin-Watson stat 1.305064 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.014333     Wald F-statistic 5.414840 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000116    
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Annex 5: Model 5 output 
 
 
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 06/10/17   Time: 18:33  
Sample: 1950 2007   
Included observations: 58  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.113456 0.011827 9.593128 0.0000 
DUMMYDEMOCRATPRES -0.016137 0.009718 -1.660493 0.1031 
INFLATION 0.214075 0.120304 1.779452 0.0812 
DEFICIT 0.205621 0.253765 0.810282 0.4216 
PRESELEC_DUMMY -0.018302 0.011800 -1.551034 0.1272 
CONGELEC_DUMMY 0.005660 0.012198 0.463985 0.6447 
GDP_GR 0.086891 0.203763 0.426430 0.6716 
DUMMY_YEAR_CRASH 0.123027 0.022356 5.503211 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.607602     Mean dependent var 0.132926 
Adjusted R-squared 0.552666     S.D. dependent var 0.051061 
S.E. of regression 0.034151     Akaike info criterion -3.788616 
Sum squared resid 0.058314     Schwarz criterion -3.504417 
Log likelihood 117.8699     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.677914 
F-statistic 11.06022     Durbin-Watson stat 1.870613 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Wald F-statistic 11.90834 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Annex 6: Model 6 a) and 6 b) output 
 
 
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 05/29/17   Time: 16:59  
Sample: 1950 2007   
Included observations: 58  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.150095 0.011501 13.05105 0.0000 
UNIFIED_DEMOCRAT -0.045269 0.013493 -3.354968 0.0014 
UNIFIED_REPUBLICAN -0.037701 0.013008 -2.898233 0.0054 
     
     R-squared 0.176772     Mean dependent var 0.132926 
Adjusted R-squared 0.146836     S.D. dependent var 0.051061 
S.E. of regression 0.047163     Akaike info criterion -3.220073 
Sum squared resid 0.122339     Schwarz criterion -3.113499 
Log likelihood 96.38212     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.178560 
F-statistic 5.905073     Durbin-Watson stat 1.271328 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004751     Wald F-statistic 6.431079 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.003092    
     
      
Dependent Variable: VOL_ANNUAL  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 06/05/17   Time: 15:01  
Sample: 1950 2007   
Included observations: 58  
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 4.0000)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.114887 0.012320 9.324903 0.0000 
INFLATION 0.232749 0.130604 1.782099 0.0809 
DEFICIT 0.233760 0.254958 0.916858 0.3637 
GDP_GR 0.131065 0.193484 0.677392 0.5013 
UNIFIED_DEMOCRAT -0.028656 0.009673 -2.962527 0.0047 
UNIFIED_REPUBLICAN -0.016996 0.013748 -1.236253 0.2223 
DUMMY_YEAR_CRASH 0.112784 0.025660 4.395355 0.0001 
PRESELEC_DUMMY -0.023140 0.012003 -1.927776 0.0597 
CONGELEC_DUMMY 0.009268 0.011423 0.811370 0.4211 
     
     R-squared 0.641465     Mean dependent var 0.132926 
Adjusted R-squared 0.582929     S.D. dependent var 0.051061 
S.E. of regression 0.032975     Akaike info criterion -3.844384 
Sum squared resid 0.053282     Schwarz criterion -3.524660 
Log likelihood 120.4871     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.719845 
F-statistic 10.95841     Durbin-Watson stat 1.923791 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Wald F-statistic 9.998431 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Annex 7: Ramsey RESET Test (all models) output 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test Model 2   
Equation: MOD2TESE   
Specification: VOL_ANNUAL C DIV_DUMMY  INFLATION 
        DUMMY_YEAR_CRASH DEFICIT PRESELEC_DUMMY 
        CONGELEC_DUMMY GDP_GR  
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values 
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.396456  49  0.6935  
F-statistic  0.157177 (1, 49)  0.6935  
Likelihood ratio  0.185749  1  0.6665  
     
     
 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test Model 4 b)   
Equation: MOD4B   
Specification: VOL_ANNUAL C STRONGDIVIDED WEAKDIVIDED  
        INFLATION DEFICIT PRESELEC_DUMMY 
CONGELEC_DUMMY 
        GDP_GR   
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values 
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.613078  49  0.5427  
F-statistic  0.375865 (1, 49)  0.5427  
Likelihood ratio  0.443204  1  0.5056  
     
      
 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test Model 6 b)   
Equation: MOD6B   
Specification: VOL_ANNUAL C   INFLATION DEFICIT  GDP_GR 
        UNIFIED_DEMOCRAT UNIFIED_REPUBLICAN 
        DUMMY_YEAR_CRASH PRESELEC_DUMMY 
        CONGELEC_DUMMY  
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values 
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.593483  48  0.5556  
F-statistic  0.352222 (1, 48)  0.5556  
Likelihood ratio  0.424048  1  0.5149  
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Annex 8: Variance Inflation Factors (all models) output 
 
 
Variance Inflation Factors Model 2 
Date: 09/11/17   Time: 23:28 
Sample: 1950 2007  
Included observations: 58 
    
     Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    C  0.000146  10.20360  NA 
DIV_DUMMY  8.38E-05  3.193603  1.648468 
INFLATION  0.016211  3.934973  1.949988 
DUMMY_YEAR_CR
ASH  0.000637  3.639934  3.211437 
DEFICIT  0.068468  4.009231  3.384367 
PRESELEC_DUMMY  0.000144  4.641298  4.424186 
CONGELEC_DUMM
Y  0.000130  6.554556  4.273691 
GDP_GR  0.032821  4.627955  1.658961 
    
     
 
Variance Inflation Factors Model 4 b) 
Date: 09/11/17   Time: 23:29 
Sample: 1950 2007  
Included observations: 58 
    
     Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    C  0.000441  23.28378  NA 
STRONGDIVIDED  0.000247  1.977842  1.322452 
WEAKDIVIDED  0.000576  2.910012  2.556634 
INFLATION  0.027195  6.372586  1.662288 
DEFICIT  0.217234  7.382382  3.057684 
PRESELEC_DUMMY  0.000169  2.847372  2.287373 
CONGELEC_DUMMY  0.000108  4.871286  2.309035 
GDP_GR  0.059004  7.995003  1.867164 
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Variance Inflation Factors 
Date: 09/11/17   Time: 23:30 
Sample: 1950 2007  
Included observations: 58 
    
     Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    C  0.000152  11.49059  NA 
INFLATION  0.017057  4.143457  2.177921 
DEFICIT  0.065004  4.122985  3.541246 
GDP_GR  0.037436  5.512524  1.808631 
UNIFIED_DEMOCRAT  9.36E-05  2.978814  2.136349 
UNIFIED_REPUBLICAN  0.000189  1.729076  1.352295 
DUMMY_YEAR_CRASH  0.000658  3.781836  3.351985 
PRESELEC_DUMMY  0.000144  5.048542  4.688544 
CONGELEC_DUMMY  0.000130  6.958671  4.503807 
    
     
 
